{"id":"src_arkzdcjpoe68","title":"An Optimal Control Framework for Finite Patron Grant Allocation in Decentralized Micro-Commission Markets","authorName":"Christina Paul","abstract":"This paper investigates the strategic liquidation and distribution of a finite, state-constrained pool of funding resources within a decentralized science (DeSci) framework. Operating with a rigid ceiling of G=10 available patron grants, we construct an optimal control model using a continuous-time Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman (HJB) formulation. We derive the exact analytical solution for the optimal payout trajectory under different market regimes of user submission frequency and empirical metadata quality. Finally, we provide a deterministic boundary condition to protect the protocol against treasury exhaustion under sudden surges in data volume.","tags":["optimal control","dynamic programming","token economics","resource allocation","applied math"],"priceUSDC":"0.0001"}